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The changing international landscape and the 
Responsibility to Protect
In the last two decades, the international system underwent significant 
changes. The most important issue in current international relations 
relates to the nature of the change from a uni-polar world to a multi-
polar structure after the end of the Cold War. In addition to the econo-
mic and political rise of China, recent years have seen an increasingly 
proactive and nationalistic Russia as well as growing assertiveness by 
major regional powers (Laskaris and Kreutz, 2015), as a diverse group 
of formerly peripheral states became increasingly empowered: not just 
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 China, India and Brazil, but also South Africa, Indonesia and others 
that are commonly referred to as ‘emerging powers’.
As a result, some analysts argued that the “West” was confronting the 
“rise of the rest” (Zacharia, 2008; Hiro, 2010), and that North-South 
traditional relations begin to be transformed with the emergence of a 
more assertive Global South.
The recent rise of the South challenges the common ideas behind 
North-South relations. A new approach for understanding North-South 
relations is emerging. This approach moves beyond the traditional 
concepts of domination and modernization and stresses a more in-
dependent and proactive Global South. Most importantly, the South 
is challenging the post–World War II world order. Both Brazil and 
India are demanding permanent seats on the UN Security Council 
and several countries, including Germany, are asking for a reform of 
the UN. Additionally, a number of Southern countries such as South 
Africa, Turkey, Brazil, México and Argentina now sit at the influential 
G-20 summit meetings (i.e., the world’s most powerful economies) to 
make an impact on global policy (Ripley, 2014: 149-150).
Emerging powers are increasing their influence in international affairs, 
both as individual actors, as members of multilateral institutions or as 
participants of Global South blocs such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) or 
MIKTA (México, Indonesia, South Corea, Turkey, Australia). This 
reconfiguration also created the conditions for a new geopolitical 
landscape in the Americas, with the establishment of organizations 
such as ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas), UNASUR (Union 
of South American States,), CELAC (Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States) or the Pacific Alliance, some of them with strong 
focus on South-South cooperation and increasing autonomy from the 
United States, while the previously established OAS (Organization of 
American States) and other groups linking the North with South are 
still persistent.
Within this framework, “Western” values and norms, which traditio-
nally permeated the debate on the global agenda began to be reviewed 
or contested by the new emerging actors. Simultaneously with other 
global processes, the diffusion of norms and particular normative con-
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ceptions from the Global South, moved the discipline of international 
relations from “international relations” toward the study of global gover-
nance (Sikkink, 2015: 350; Serbin, 2013: 181), which includes a broad 
array of state and non-states actors involved in global power dynamics.
In this regard, the end of World War II and the establishment of the 
United Nations carried important implications for state sovereignty. 
These events ushered in a wave of decolonization resulting in the 
creation of new formally sovereign states over the next several decades, 
drastically altering the international landscape. Furthermore, states in 
the Global South have, at least in the wake of decolonization, been 
more enthusiastic in their promotion of strict sovereignty than their 
Northern counterparts (Coe, 2015: 275). As pointed out by Rotmann 
and al. (2014: 256), decolonization made them equal members of the 
global order in name only: the rules of the game were set long ago by 
Europe and the United States. As seen from Beijing, Brasilia or Delhi, 
‘resistance to the West required urgent adaptation to Western ideas 
of […] the nation-state’. From this perspective, state sovereignty and 
non-interference were among the most relevant aspects of a global 
normative order emerging powers had never been able to shape. 
However, after the Second World War, Western notions of sovereignty 
associated with the Westphalian understanding of the role of the State 
in the international system were gradually embedded in the emerging 
worldviews from the South, while through the process of decoloni-
zation that developed after the Second World War, the principle of 
non-intervention was also closely associated to the notion of national 
sovereignty (Serbin, 2010).
These changes also affected the process of globalization of human 
rights (Coicaud, Doyle and Gardener, 2003), as understood by Western 
major powers, raising the question of who sets the global human rights 
agenda and the norms associated to it in the international system, 
and how those norms were associated with a diffusion from the North 
or with its vernacular adaptation on a national and local level by the 
South.1 In this regard, Acharya (2004, 2011) introduced the concept 
of “localization” arguing that local actors actively reconstruct global 
norms “to create a fit between those norms and prior local norms”, and 
the notion of norm “subsidiarity” (or “norm protagonism”, according 
to Sikkink), whereby states and regional actors create new norms or 
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new understandings of existing global norms (Sikkink, 2015: 350). The 
diffusion of global norms also involves “norms entrepreneurs” that can 
shape them in a different form. Dominguez (2008) has stressed in this 
regard, that Latin American organizations have been “international 
rule innovators”, particularly in the 20th century and even previous 
to the process of decolonization, showing how Latin American states 
pioneered the defense of sovereignty and non-intervention, but also 
modified later such doctrines to permit international intervention on 
behalf of democracy. Following this observation, Sikkink argues “that 
Latin American states, regional organizations, and social movements 
were much more than passive recipients of an international human 
rights regime imposed from outside” and greater attention should be 
payed to the “protagonist” role of states and social actors outside the 
global North “despite important structural inequality in the interna-
tional system” (Sikkink, 2015: 350).
However, the post-Cold War era witnessed not only the globalization 
of human rights and the related subsequent norms approved and 
promoted by the UN and by several regional organizations, according 
to different interpretations and priorities, but also an increasing (and 
general) concern, particularly after the crisis in Bosnia and Rwanda, 
about the prevention of mass atrocities and how the international 
community should be dealing with them and the arising humanita-
rian crisis, in a gradual transition from the concept of “humanitarian 
intervention” to the notion of the “Responsibility to Protect” (RtoP) 
in the event of mass atrocities against civilians (Evans, 2006).
The debate about a Responsibility to Protect people from mass atroci-
ties – even if they are perpetrated by its own State - goes to the core of 
current changes in the world. Coinciding with the shift of power and 
influence away from the West, its evolution as a norm has become a 
crucial arena in which fundamental conflicts about the future global 
order play out. The nascent evolution of a responsibility to protect 
‘from idea to norm’, as its supporters put it, has been accompanied 
by growing controversy. From its first global endorsement at the UN 
General Assembly in 2005 to the fallout over the military intervention 
in Libya in 2011, the issue has become heavily contested. However, 
in spite of the criticism and the contestation, the misuse of the RtoP 
language suggests a paradox: this norm is better understood and more 
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broadly accepted than often believed (Bradescu and Weiss, 2014:16). 
Indeed, the debates around a Responsibility to Protect provide a uni-
que opportunity to analyze the changing global order in a way that 
focuses on fundamental conflicts over sovereignty and responsibility 
(Rotmann, Kurtz and Brockheimer, 2014: 357).
The RtoP concept, formalized by the 2005 United Nations (UN) 
World Summit (UN General Assembly, 2005) and the 2009 Report 
of the Secretary-General (UN Secretary-General, 2009) may face re-
newed scrutiny in a future multilateral system.2 While RtoP was not 
imposed only by the West, the view of human rights as an important 
concern for international relations has been promoted by democratic, 
particularly European, states. Thus, this specific issue-area provides a 
suitable setting to explore whether rising powers may adapt to or seek 
reforms or even removal of existing international norms and agreements 
(Laskaris and Kreutz, 2015: 150).
While institutionalized discussions about RtoP first began in the 1990s, 
the promotion of human rights through military interventions and 
sanctions, aid allocation and supranational institutions had previously 
been mentioned in the foreign policy goals in Europe and the USA. 
However, while the concern for humanitarian suffering influenced the 
practice of the UN and other powers, the norm only became formalized 
in the early 2000s. 
As aptly described by Alex Bellamy in his chapter, the principles of 
the Responsibility to Protect are based on three pillars. First, that the 
responsibility lies on the State to protect its population from mass atro-
cities. Second, that the international community has a responsibility to 
assist the State to fulfill this duty. Third, if the State is manifestly failing 
to protect its population from mass atrocities, then the international 
community must be prepared to take collective action to protect the 
people by proportional means ranging from peaceful to coercive in ac-
cordance with the UN Charter. As with most broad policy documents, 
these pillars are open to interpretation with regards to when and how 
they should be applied. This is particularly the case for the first and 
second pillars which generally receive a consensual support from both 
the Western countries and the Global South, especially represented 
by the BRICS group (Stuenkel, 2014). The third pillar is the subject 
of most of the divergent views by the UN member states, and creates 
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a division between the West and the rest regarding the use of force as 
the mechanism to be implemented by the international community 
in nations suffering from the incapacity of the State to deal with mass 
atrocities within its borders. As noted by Arredondo in his chapter in 
this volume:
“The third pillar, which upholds the necessity of a “timely and 
decisive response,” is clearly the most controversial one as it 
opens the possibility of the use of force within the framework 
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this regard, it should be 
noted that there remains some sensitivity to the potential risks 
of abuse arising from the application of the concept in practice, 
which proved truthful after NATO’s actions in Libya in 2011”.
However, while the use of force has been the most fiercely debated 
option within the RtoP framework as an instrument of external inter-
vention in domestic affairs, it is by no means the only measure through 
which the international community can contribute to the protection 
of civilians (Laskaris and Kreutz, 2015:150-151).
When addressing those issues, the conventional interpretation of 
national sovereignty contrasts with the idea of a “responsible or con-
ditioned sovereignty”, as the “responsibility for good governance” and 
the “accountability to national constituencies and the international 
community”. These principles were the precursors of the concept of 
“Responsibility to Protect” (RtoP), particularly when moving from 
the concept of the control of the State to its responsibility vis á vis its 
citizens (Deng, 2000). Divergent views on national sovereignty and 
its reach translate into different perceptions and interpretations of 
RtoP and the use of force as a last resort, and this divide is a source 
of important controversy. Similarly, the rest of the world addresses 
the issue of human rights and democracy through its own lens, de-
veloping particular interpretations according to their own values and 
worldviews.
In this regard, the most transformative aspect of the human rights 
regime for the international system is found not in its growth  in sco-
pe, instruments, implementation, and players but in its impact on a 
fundamental principle of international relations: state sovereignty. By 
granting rights to individuals, the conception of human rights limits 
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state sovereignty, as a state´s legitimacy is tied to proper treatment of 
its citizens (Doyle and Gardner, 2003: 3). Therefore, one of the basic 
existing tensions is between the traditional/conventional principles 
of national sovereignty and non-intervention, and the defense of hu-
man rights which reaches its peak when dealing with the four crimes 
addressed by RtoP.
It is along this background, that several questions could be raised 
regarding the emergence of RtoP as a new norm and its assimilation 
or reformulation by the diverse countries and regions of the Global 
South. Latin America in particular, represents a cauldron of different 
ways of processing and reacting to the new norm and this special issue 
of the journal attempts to address the existing regional divergences 
from this perspective, following previous issues on the applicability 
of RtoP in the region and the reform of the Inter-American Human 
Rights System (Anaya and Saltalamacchia, 2013).
Within this framework, the main questions to be answered is if the 
different positions adopted by Latin American countries regarding 
RtoP make a substantial difference in its global acceptance and if those 
countries still keep a certain role as  international rules innovators 
when dealing with the norm. A second question that also begs for a 
response relates the reach of certain Latin American nations with global 
aspirations to became norm entrepreneurs and to introduce substantial 
modifications to the globally discussed norms. 
Nonetheless, before moving to the discussion on RtoP in Latin Ame-
rica, we should note two important issues related to the development 
of this norm in the global sphere.
First of all, RtoP is still a contested norm within the international 
system, even if, as noted by Badescu and Weiss (2010), “as expec-
ted during the early stages of a norm spiraling toward socialization, 
backlash, and contestation dominate much of public diplomacy; but 
backlash and contestation also can serve as boundary-defining exerci-
ses that clarify the actual meaning and limits of the norm” (2010:16). 
Therefore, this norm is better understood and more broadly accepted 
than often believed, as norms can advance through contestation and 
conceptual clarification (ibidem).
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Secondly, as Rotmann et al (2014) shows “while relevant on a few oc-
casions that made headlines, none of the neat splits between ‘North’ 
and ‘South’, ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’, ‘emerging’ and ‘established’, 
‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ is helpful on its own in analyzing 
evolving views on global order through the prism of a responsibility to 
protect.” Even if the norm is still under discussion, there are reiterated 
and clear changes of positions of the different countries within each 
bloc regarding RtoP.
Both observations apply to the analysis of the process of regional assi-
milation of the norm in Latin America, within a changing landscape 
of priorities, positions and initiatives by the countries of the region 
with regards to it.
Latin America and the Responsibility to Protect: 
Champions, spoilers and rule innovators
The previously presented approaches are particularly useful for explai-
ning the process of introduction, assimilation and reaction to a new 
global norm such as the “Responsibility to Protect” (RtoP) in Latin 
America and the subsequent debate on its recognition and imple-
mentation, between those nations that support the norm and those 
who are reluctant to accept it - what we call the “champions” and the 
“skeptics”, respectively.
The debate about a responsibility to protect people from mass atroci-
ties goes to the heart of current changes in the world. Coinciding with 
the shift of power and influence away from the West, its nascent and 
contested evolution as a norm has become a crucial arena in which 
fundamental conflicts about the future global order play out (Rotmann, 
Kurtz and Brockmeier, 2014), as part of the evolving tension and ba-
lance between the normative order of human rights and the modern 
international system. In Latin America, as in other parts of the world, 
the debate is clearly intertwined with the sovereignty and non-inter-
vention doctrines which are historically embedded in its diplomatic 
and juridical tradition, and the also historically consolidated trend 
of juridical thought regarding human rights and democracy, within a 
sophisticated and highly developed system of regional international 
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law and institutions (Kacowicz, 2005: 10). The debate also shows the 
ambivalent frontiers existing between the main positions regarding 
the norm, a lack of a distinctive and clear differentiation between 
both currents and the existence of an ambiguous “grey zone”. The 
apparent dichotomy between “champions” and “skeptics” is often 
blurred by slides and displacements by their respective leading voices 
to ambivalent and, sometimes, contradictory positions. A situation 
which perhaps raises the question on the validity of this dichotomy vis 
a vis the predominance and eventual broadening of the “grey zone”.
In this regard, in Latin America, reactions to the norms originated from 
the West are not monolithic. They are diverse and heterogeneous in 
the framework of eventually divergent strategic cultures in the region 
and show diverse capacities - from a full assimilation and support to the 
norm as approved by the UN3 to its rejection basically in terms of the 
defense of national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention4 
to the development of initiatives to adapt or improve the norm.5 In 
all the three cases, Latin America evidences that there is an effort to 
channel both the existing historical cultural and juridical background 
and the national interests and aspirations reflecting the principles of 
national sovereignty and non-intervention, including the efforts to 
become “norm entrepreneurs” or “rule innovators” as part of the new 
array of global players.
Many analysts argue that Latin America as a region with its own di-
plomatic and well developed juridical system is comparatively more 
peaceful than any other region in the world, and that for this reason it 
discloses particular difficulties in the full acceptance and implemen-
tation of RtoP.  However, there are several other factors that partially 
explain the reasons for this situation.
First of all, after the 1980s, most Latin American countries engaged 
in a series of democratization processes, where the consolidation and 
strengthening of human rights, democracy and the rule of law became 
an important component of the post-military regimes domestic agenda. 
As noted by Muñoz (2009), democracy and the rule of law are also part 
of a regional agenda related to RtoP, dealing with true commissions 
processes and the consolidation of democratic institutions that preserve 
the memories of past human rights violations and prevent against the 
emergence of massive human rights abuses.
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Notwithstanding these recent changes, well-embedded principles of na-
tional sovereignty, non-intervention and peaceful settlement of conflicts 
are an important part of the juridical legacy of these countries, acting 
historically as a shield against any external intervention (Kacowicz, 
2005; Arredondo, 2009). Latin American states were in the vanguard of 
the struggle to export pluralistic understanding of European interna-
tional society to the non-European world, playing a particularly central 
role in the struggle for equal sovereignty, but also developing a tradition 
that anchored such norms as strict non-intervention; increasingly tight 
restrictions on the use of force; territoriality and the pragmatic use of 
uti possidetis to stabilize borders (Engstrom and Hurrell, 2010:30).
A significant record of external interventions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, since their independence in the early 19th century, genera-
ted the conditions for the development of a strong reluctance, from 
governments and civil society, to accept any possible threat to national 
sovereignty or any attempt of external interference, usually labeled as 
colonialist or imperialist, and the external use of force to intervene in 
domestic affairs. Thanks to the European colonial powers first, and the 
US hegemony in the hemisphere later, external intervention became 
one of the most feared threats to national sovereignty in Latin Ame-
rica. Accordingly, these principles were strongly rooted in the regional 
diplomatic and legal cultures, as well as in popular beliefs and public 
opinion, and have become an important part of LAC contribution to 
the development of international law (Rodrigues, 2009).
Secondly, those principles are the cornerstones of most of the recent 
Constitutions in Latin America and, particularly, the South American 
countries, approved in the last two decades. These Constitutions also 
assert that human rights and fundamental rights are essential for the 
states, linking them to the development of international and huma-
nitarian law (Serbin, 2010).
Thirdly, Latin American countries have been strong advocates of the 
principles of national sovereignty (in the Westphalian sense), non-
intervention and self-determination since the creation of the UN in 
1945, but also committed promoters of human rights, even within the 
context of a strong record of political instability and military coups 
and regimes in the region (Arredondo, 2009). In this regard, the Latin 
American countries have been key players in the approval of the Univer-
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sal Declaration of Human Rights and its inclusion in the UN Charter, 
as incipient “norm entrepreneurs” or “international rule innovators”. 
However, the norms associated to the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention developed in parallel with those of democracy and 
human rights, “often leading to institutional and political tensions”, 
even if traditionally these tensions have been resolved in favor of state 
sovereignty (Ergstrom and Hurrel, 2010: 31).
Fourthly, currently there are no imminent threats of massive human 
rights abuses or atrocity crimes in the region, which is, per se, an ex-
traordinarily positive sign (Arredondo, 2009), although some would 
argue that the growing tensions in the Dominican Republic regarding 
Haitian immigration and Dominican born Haitians is a textbook case 
of phases previous to mass human rights violations as it exemplifies 
acts of racial violence, systematic discrimination of an ethnic group 
and a growing trends toward the suppression of the legal status of a 
minority group. Overall the Dominican Republic would be a possible 
exception in a region where we find little to no signs possible mass 
human rights violations (Serbin Pont, 2014). 
This is a result of strenuous efforts on the part of Latin American 
civil society to remember and condone past human rights abuses, 
but it is also the consequence of efforts by both governments and 
intergovernmental organizations to strengthening the rule of law and 
democracy, particularly in the case the Organization of American States 
(OAS) and the Inter-American system. The American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man, signed along with the Charter of the 
Organization of American States in 1948, was the very first interna-
tional human rights instrument, predating the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) by six months (Turner and Popovski, 2010: 
230). The consequently emerging Inter-American system has played 
a key role in addressing and dealing with human rights violations in 
Latin America throughout a triple and interconnected institutional 
structure: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights based in 
Washington, D.C., the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and 
the Inter-American Human Rights Institute located in San Jose, Costa 
Rica. These institutions also offered, probably for the first time, the 
opportunity for Latin American civil society organizations to play an 
outstanding role in preventing and denouncing human rights abuses, 
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particularly during the prevalence of military regimes, often linking 
those initiatives to the existing mechanisms of the international sys-
tem of human rights. In this regard, civil society organizations and 
movements – mainly human rights NGOs – played a key role in the 
presentation and defense of successful appeals to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, where the possibility of accepting 
individual petitions exists (Cançado Trinidade, 2007). As a result, 
the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS), along with its 
European and African counterparts, constitutes one of the world´s 
principal regional human rights systems (Cardenas, 2010: 87).
As a fifth distinctive feature, the regional experience shows that there 
is a clear preference, in extreme cases, to accept a role for the OAS, 
regional or sub-regional inter-governmental organizations, or “groups 
of friends”, in the process of influencing a peaceful outcome for the 
regional conflicts – both inter-state and intrastate - , being the UN 
the last resort for solving inter-state disputes and tensions, even if in 
some cases, long-standing disputes (particularly border and territorial 
disputes and bi-lateral conflicts) tend to be derived to the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague, as a way of looking for a juridical 
solution which usually is accepted by both parties (Sotomayor, 2008). 
However, although Latin American governments have been leaders in 
creating new regional and sub-regional arrangements –including the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) at the OAS and several 
Democratic clauses at different recently created regional and sub-
regional organizations such as UNASUR  and MERCOSUR, these 
organizations do not have strongly embedded mass atrocity prevention 
mechanisms (Pace, 2012: 20).
On the other hand, the role of the Contadora group (which later became 
the Río Group) in the case of the Central American crisis in the 80´s, 
the role of the “group of friends” in the case of the Peru-Ecuador border 
conflict in the 90´s, the presence of the OAS in polarized and conflicted 
electoral processes such as in Venezuela, and the role of UNASUR in 
the Pando crisis in Bolivia (and the Colombia vs. Ecuador/Venezuela 
tensions) (Serbin, 2010b) illustrate a clear recent trend to avoid external 
actors’ intervention, with the probable exception of the case of Haiti.6 
However previously, in the 80s and 90s, the role of UN missions in the 
process of peace negotiations and its implementation was also crucial 
in Central America, as shown in the chapter by Aguilera on Guatemala.
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Within this context, several Latin American countries are increasingly 
supportive of RtoP, basically accepting the pre-eminence of human 
rights and the protection of their citizen´s over the principles of na-
tional sovereignty and non-intervention. In this regard, as one of the 
authors argued in a recent paper, the globalization of human rights, 
international and humanitarian law, and the rule of law, linked to the 
historical development and legacy of human rights in the region are 
becoming pre-eminent to those principles, even within several recently 
approved Constitutions (Serbin, 2010). It is important to note, in this 
regard, that particularly after the demise of military regimes in the 
region the human rights regime evolved in the context of changing 
concepts of the State and had lasting impact upon the traditional 
conception of state sovereignty. Additionally to that, as argued by 
some analysts, “State policies were increasingly subjected to normative, 
political and legal constraints that challenged conventional unders-
tandings of sovereignty and consolidated the growing consensus that 
human rights are matters not only of domestic jurisdiction but also of 
concern to the international community, particularly when large-scale 
violations take place” (Turner and Popovski, 2010: 232).
In fact, the combination of an accumulative experience of human 
rights government policies and civil society organizations initiatives, 
and the endorsement of the RtoP principle by several Latin American 
and Caribbean governments, prove that there is a gradual tendency to 
accept an eventual intervention of the international community either 
in cases of humanitarian crisis or of natural disasters, particularly if 
it is lead or promoted by regional organizations such as the OAS or 
UNASUR and it stays short of the use of force.
During the recent development of a phase of new regionalism – “post-
neoliberal” or “post-hegemonic” (Serbin, Martinez and Ramanzini, 
2012), with a strengthened state-centric emphasis, these two ap-
proaches within the regional juridical tradition oppose the role of the 
state against the rights of the citizens (Wolff, 2013), and affect the 
performance and development of a vibrant civil society. Nevertheless 
the existence of this opposition does not impede the emergence of an 
important debate that “shapes the adaptation of the new norm in the 
region” (Rotmann, Kurtz and Brockmier, 2014).
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While the “skeptics” of RtoP in the region can be associated with 
governments that maintain a strong anti-US rhetoric as well as with 
proponents of more state centric and protectionist conceptions of 
regional integration that emphasize sovereignty and non-intervention 
doctrines, this does not apply to all the cases. Argentina being a prime 
example, as its government since 2003 has been confrontational with 
US policy in the region while assuming a leadership role in supporting 
regional integration initiatives such as UNASUR, yet has eventually 
positioned itself as a “champion” – with some qualifications and 
contradictions as shown by Arredondo in this volume - in matters of 
promoting and supporting the principle of RtoP. In some cases, this 
is in part associated with a long standing history of cooperation with 
the UN, participation in international peacekeeping operations, but 
also a strong emphasis in promoting the respect for human rights 
both internally as well as externally. Another example is Ecuador that, 
according to Dolores Bermeo contribution to this volume, while ideo-
logically associated with Venezuela and Cuba as a member of ALBA, 
has maintained a moderate position towards RtoP in contrast with its 
ALBA partners. These two cases, question the idea that opposition or 
support for RtoP is solely based on the government´s current ideology, 
as it is rather due to the confluence of diverse internal and external 
factors associated with a history of human rights violations, the posi-
tioning in global affairs, the interpretation of international norms, and 
the traditions in the foreign policy development of these countries.
In this context, it is key to understand that Brazil´s 2011 proposal 
on Responsibility While Protecting is not merely a response to the 
Responsibility to Protect as it emerged in 2001 or the use of the norm 
in the Libyan crisis, but rather represents a culmination of Brazil´s 
engagement with questions of international intervention and norma-
tive manifestation as part of its expanding efforts to position itself 
globally by integrating to the central debate on international policy 
making. However, as shown in our own chapter on the issue, Brazilian 
aspirations to become a “norm entrepreneur” on a global level didn´t 
build on a regional consensus (and, on the contrary, avoided any regio-
nal consultation notwithstanding the widespread support it received 
after launching RwP as shown in most of the country cases presented 
in this volume), and didn´t achieve the full support of other Global 
South nations (Stuenkel, 2014). Additionally, Brazil´s lack of follow up 
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elaboration regarding RwP stalled its impact in the global debate that 
witnessed no further discussion after 2012. Once Brazil left its seat at 
the UN Security Council the initiative tended to lose momentum in 
the international debate and relevance within Brazilian foreign policy 
being displaced by other priorities (Stuenkel, 2013).
Interestingly enough, a country of more restricted international reach 
and with far less ambitious global aspirations, Costa Rica, has been 
more consistent in its contributions to the principle of RtoP and has 
been perceived as one of the most fervent supporters, or “champions” 
in regards to advocacy efforts for the advancement of the principle. Its 
emphasis on The Arms Trade Treaty as a key element in reinforcing 
preventive capabilities of RtoP, as pointed out by Cordero and Harmon 
in this issue, can be considered a much more profound contribution to 
the normative development of RtoP, therefore positioning the country 
on the short list of Latin American norm entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, the three general tendencies profiled regarding the 
Responsibility to Protect in Latin America help us outline regional 
positions towards the principle, yet they do not function as a categori-
zation mechanism in which we can conglomerate the hows and whys of 
these positions. Further analysis is critical to understand the position of 
Latin American countries, and this is why we aim at providing deeper 
insights into the development of policies towards the Responsibly to 
Protect and the assimilation or rejection of the norm in the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, and 
Venezuela. By understanding the complexity of country positions 
towards RtoP within the regional and global context, we can have a 
better picture of the role of Latin America regarding the debate on RtoP 
and particularly, the reach of Global South nation’s efforts to become 
norm setters and innovators within the new global order. 
The structure of this volume
In a previous special issue of this journal dedicated to the applicabi-
lity of RtoP in Latin America,7 several researchers made an effort to 
introduce the issue in the regional academic debate, focusing on the 
general presentation of the evolution of the norm, its reach, the role 
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of civil society, and the main governments involved, both on a global 
and on a regional level. This issue attempts to reorient the debate 
towards the different (and sometimes changing) positions of several 
Latin American countries with regards to RtoP, and their contribution 
to the global debate on the norm.
This approach is introduced  in the first chapter by Alex Bellamy, set-
ting the basic traits and characteristics of the evolution of the norm 
on the global level, particularly with reference to the UN debates, 
and addressing the reach and limits of the Brazilian proposition of 
the Responsibility while Protecting as a contribution to the debate, 
especially with regards to the limits of the suggested sequencing of 
the three pillars of RtoP.
Following this chapter, a first section is dedicated to the countries we 
consider “champions” of RtoP in the region: Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Chile and Guatemala – all members of the “Group of Friends of RtoP” 
at the UN – whose foreign policies are strongly rooted in the defense of 
human rights particularly after suffering periods of military dictatorship 
and political turmoil as in the cases of Argentina, Chile and Guatemala 
or because they historically had been supporters of global norms and 
treaties that favor the interest of peace as in the case of Costa Rica. 
While two of the first chapters clearly refer in a supportive way to the 
Brazilian initiative of the Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), the 
chapter on Costa Rica links the debate on RtoP with the Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT) as a crucial tool to prevent violence and promote peace 
and, from our perspective, positions Costa Rica amongst the few cu-
rrent norm innovators in the region.
A second section is dedicated to the “grey zone”, the countries that 
combine their positive historical record on human rights with a so-
metimes contradictory contestation of the norm mostly because of 
a perceived threat of external intervention that would benefit major 
Western powers interests and affect national sovereignty. Indeed this 
perception permeates not only these two chapters, on Brazil and its 
initiative of RwP and on Ecuador and its apparently, according to 
Dolores Bermeo, ambiguous position within the most strident group 
of regional skeptics – the Bolivarian ALBA member states, but also is 
present and transverses the positions of both the champions and the 
skeptics in the region.  This section is particularly relevant because of 
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the attempt of Brazil to become a global player introducing modifi-
cations in the conceptualization and operationalization of the global 
norm, without building support, as already noted, from the region or 
from the BRICS as emerging players in the international system. Also, 
it shows how domestic constraints and changing priorities in foreign 
policy can abort or derail these initiatives.
A third section is dedicated to the Bolivarian skeptics: Venezuela and 
Cuba, historically hostile to the norm.8 However, it is interesting to 
note that additionally to the recurrent concern regarding national 
sovereignty, non-intervention and the threat of a regime change as 
the implicit reason for rejecting any external interference, Venezuela´s 
position is closely related, at some point, with the support of RwP, 
while the chapter on Cuba ignores the Brazilian initiative and focuses 
on its own foreign policy consistent rejection of RtoP as an external 
intervention tool that is not related to  humanitarian interests.
Finally, we close this volume with a Dossier with two papers in Spanish 
on the situation of human rights and mass atrocities in El Salvador, 
as a potential test case for the implications of RtoP in Latin America, 
as part of a current project developed by CRIES. As already noted, 
prevention mechanisms for mass atrocities are absent from the already 
established and the recently emerging regional organizations. However, 
this is not an impediment to the potential emergence of crisis that 
could develop beyond the individual human rights abuses to situations 
of massive crimes. Even if this is not currently the case in El Salvador, 
the two papers show, from a civil society perspective, that there are 
reasons for concern in this regard. 
All in all, this special issue dedicated to the Latin American positions, 
even if not covering all the main regional actors, reflects the current 
debate in the region, its capacity and its limits of influencing the 
global debate on RtoP, particularly through the positions expressed 
by national representatives at the UN.
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NOTES
1. According to Coe (2015:277) “norm” is a “standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity.” It is not only a pattern of 
behavior but a “prescribed pattern of behavior which gives rise to 
normative expectations as to what ought to be done.” From a cons-
tructivist approach, norms at both cultural and political levels are an 
important part of shaping international politics, and while the state 
may remain the most important actor, norms create identity for the 
states themselves. 
2. As our chapter in this issue on Brazil and the Responsibility of 
Protecting shows.
3. It should be noted that among the Latin American countries mem-
bers of the UN Group of Friends of Responsibility to Protect, that 
consistently  supported the norm are included Argentina, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, México, Panamá, and Uruguay.
4. As in the most evident cases of Venezuela and Cuba.
5. As in the case of Brazil and its initiative to promote the “Responsibility 
while Protecting” (RwP), or, on a global scale, China´s initiative of 
“Protection Responsibility”.
6. Which is still under critical scrutiny by several Latin American 
governments (even if some of them are involved in the UN peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction operation – MINUSTAH, 
after the 1.559 resolution of the UN Security Council in 2004) 
(Brigagão, 2006), and by most of Latin American civil society 
organizations and networks (Jácome, Milet and Serbin, 2005).
7. Pensamiento Propio, 17, No. 35, January-June 2012, Special issue on 
“La Responsabilidad de Proteger y su aplicabilidad en América Latina”. 
Available at: www.cries.org
8. Both were among the four countries that contested it during the 2005 
Summit jointly with another Bolivarian member state – Nicaragua, 
and Sudan.
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